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How Should Feminist Autonomy Theorists Respond to the Problem
of Internalized Oppression?
In “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition,”1 Natalie Stoljar asks
whether a procedural or a substantive approach to autonomy is best for
addressing feminist concerns.2 On the most general level, a theory is procedural if it does not a priori rule out any specific decisions or preferences. In other words, as long as you follow the given procedure to
come to a decision, whatever decision you make is considered autonomous. In contrast, substantive theories tend to include additional criteria
such as requiring sufficient self-respect or self-worth3 or requiring specific content of beliefs or preferences such as knowing the difference between right and wrong.4 Another key difference is that procedural theories rely solely on the subjective perspective or the “internal” decisionmaking process, whereas strong substantive theories include nonsubjective criteria or certain “external” value judgments.
Ultimately, Stoljar argues that feminists should adopt a substantive
approach to autonomy. I will build on Stoljar’s argument. Since Stoljar
gives an in-depth analysis of why procedural theories cannot adequately
address feminist concerns, I only briefly explain this problem in the first
section.5 Specifically, I emphasize how procedural theories fail to ade1

Natalie Stoljar, “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition,” in Catriona Mackenzie and
Natalie Stoljar (eds.), Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency,
and the Social Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 94-111.
2
For examples of feminist discussions about the pros and cons of procedural versus
substantive theories of autonomy, see Paul Benson, “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization,” Social Theory and Practice 17 (1991): 385-408; “Free Agency and Self-Worth,”
The Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994): 650-68; “Freedom and Value,” The Journal of
Philosophy 84 (1987): 465-86; Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003); Mackenzie and Stoljar (eds.), Relational Autonomy;
Diana T. Meyers, Gender in the Mirror: Cultural Imagery and Women’s Agency (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002).
3
Benson, “Free Agency and Self-Worth”; Robin S. Dillon, “Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect,” Hypatia 7 (1992): 52-69.
4
Susan Wolf, “Asymmetrical Freedom,” The Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 151-66.
5
In her analysis, Stoljar considers five different ways that procedural theorists interpret the critical reflection necessary for autonomy. She argues that none of these versions
can adequately account for the feminist intuition that decisions influenced by oppressive

quately address what is pernicious about some forms of socialization or
the problem of internalized oppression.6 Stoljar further argues that feminist autonomy theorists should adopt a strong substantive theory. In the
second section, I build on this argument by starting to articulate my own
theory.7 I use two similar cases to explain my theory and show how a
strong substantive theory can more accurately address the problem of
internalized oppression. In the final section, I briefly address some of the
concerns raised by procedural theorists who are leery of a substantive
approach. Specifically, procedural theorists worry that substantive autonomy unduly narrows the scope of autonomy and overemphasizes
women’s victimhood while ignoring their agency. In contrast, I argue
that procedural theorists are too generous in their definition of autonomy.
The Problem
Procedural autonomy theorists believe that autonomy has to do with how
people make decisions rather than the specific content of the decisions.8
For this reason, procedural theories are considered “content neutral.” In
general, an agent uses critical (or self-) reflection to learn about herself
(increase self-knowledge). Critical reflection means that a person must
reflect (or at least be willing to reflect) on her personal preferences (including desires, beliefs, values, and goals). Through this process of reflection, she will identify with some preferences and reject others. This is

norms of femininity should not count as autonomous.
6
My understanding of oppression is that it is a harm inflicted on an individual based
on her group membership. Internalized oppression is internalized norms that lead a person to participate in perpetuating her own oppression. For more detailed definitions of
oppression, see Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York: Routledge, 1990); Ann E. Cudd, Analyzing Oppression
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality: Essays
in Feminist Theory (Freedom, Cal.: The Crossing Press, 1983).
7
Stoljar considers two versions of Paul Benson’s normative competence criteria and
argues that the stronger version is necessary to account for the feminist intuition (for
more on the theories she uses, see Benson, “Free Agency and Self-Worth,” and “Freedom
and Value”). I argue that this version (discussed later in the paper) is insufficient and
needs more definition about what specific beliefs or reasons are problematic. Benson’s
weaker version discusses self-worth, or self-respect; I also discuss this criterion, but do
not interpret it exactly in the same way Benson uses it.
8
A sample of procedural autonomy theorists includes: John Christman, “Autonomy
and Personal History,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991): 1-24; Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988); Harry G. Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Friedman, Autonomy, Gender,
Politics; Diana T. Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1989).

how she makes preferences “her own” or creates an authentic self. Autonomous decisions or actions will be those that are in keeping with her
self-chosen preferences or her authentic self. Developing preferences that
are “our own” and living in harmony with them is what it means to be
autonomous. In this way, procedural theorists claim that autonomy has to
do with how a decision is made, not what decision is made. With this
overview, we can see that procedural autonomy theorists emphasize critical reflection, authenticity, and content neutrality. I consider these to be
the key components of a procedural approach to autonomy theory.
Procedural theorists often make distinctions between preferences, beliefs, values, goals, and principles. While I recognize that these are not
the same thing, what they have in common is that procedural theorists
believe they must be open to self-reflection to count as autonomous. In
other words, regardless of whether they are discussing preferences, beliefs, values, goals, or principles, procedural theorists assess autonomy
from the “internal” or subjective perspective. For this reason, I do not believe a fine-tuned distinction is necessary here. Instead, I will use “preferences” as a shorthand for these various self-reflections and endorsements.
As we turn our attention to substantive autonomy, things become
more complicated. Instead of relying on the general procedure for autonomous decision-making, substantive theorists use a wider variety of
approaches. For this reason, it is more difficult to summarize the key
components of substantive theories. We can start by separating substantive approaches into weak substantive theories and strong substantive
theories.9 In general, I argue that weak substantive theories are “supplemental”—they add requirements to the procedure for autonomous decision-making. For example, Trudy Govier adopts Diana Meyers’s procedural approach to autonomy, but argues that women must also have selftrust for the procedure to be efficacious.10 Like procedural theorists,
weak substantive theorists rely mainly on an internal process of critical
or self-reflection, but argue that the procedure will “work” (yield an autonomous decision) only if the person has the proper “self-trust” (or other self-reflexive attitudes). In contrast, strong substantive theories go
“beyond” the subjective perspective that procedural theorists insist on.
Instead of relying on an internal (subjective) procedure for autonomous
decision-making, strong substantive theorists argue that autonomy requires
specific nonsubjective or “external” criteria. In this discussion I will focus on strong substantive theories.11
9

I take this general category distinction from the literature review in Mackenzie and
Stoljar (eds.), Relational Autonomy, pp. 3-31.
10
Trudy Govier, “Self-Trust, Autonomy, and Self-Esteem,” Hypatia 8 (1993): 99120.
11
In addition to the Govier article, another example of a weak substantive approach is

Stoljar understands why some feminist theorists are drawn to a procedural approach. One feminist criticism of traditional autonomy theories is
that these theories seem to require substantive independence and other
“masculine” norms. In contrast, feminists want a theory of autonomy that
can accommodate a wide range of preferences. For these reasons, many
feminists find an approach to autonomy that does not rule out any specific preferences (the content neutrality of procedural theories) very attractive. Given feminist work on social construction, feminist autonomy
theorists also want to develop a theory that can rule out as autonomous
preferences that are the result of harmful forms of socialization. Most
recent theories of autonomy admit that we are all products of our socialization (hence the name “relational autonomy”) and—in this sense—none
of our preferences is completely “our own.” However, feminist autonomy theorists want to account for the difference between benign and
pernicious forms of socialization. For example, Diana Meyers states:
The question is not whether to have a coercive or a noncoercive form of childhood socialization. Since there is no such thing as noncoercive childhood socialization, but since
socialization is an inescapable feature of civilization, some form of coercive socialization
must be justifiable. Indeed, it is not the coerciveness of socialization that generally draws
fire. It is when socialization harms peoples that the process itself falls under suspicion.12

Thus, one question a feminist autonomy theorist must address is which
types of socialization are acceptable and which are not.
Feminists who defend procedural theories believe they can adequately
account for pernicious aspects of socialization in the procedure itself,
thereby addressing feminist concerns but also keeping the content neutrality they cherish.13 Stoljar is skeptical about this approach.
Despite the apparent advantages, however, feminists should be cautious about adopting a
purely procedural account of autonomy. In certain cases, even preferences satisfying the
standards of critical reflection that are required by procedural accounts would still be
Carolyn McLeod, Self-Trust and Reproductive Autonomy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2002). Examples of strong substantive approaches include: Susan M. Babbitt, Impossible
Dreams: Rationality, Integrity, and Moral Imagination (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,
1996); Wolf, “Asymmetrical Freedom.” For the moment, I avoid discussing weak substantive theories because I am not sure that the distinction between weak and strong substantive theories can be maintained. If we take seriously some of the added requirements
included by weak substantive theorists, then those requirements seem to be doing most of
the work (which makes the procedural requirement superfluous). Also, if we take them
seriously enough, they indirectly rule out certain desires or reasons for acting in the same
way strong substantive theories do. For example, could someone with sufficient selfrespect autonomously adopt certain subservient beliefs influenced by oppressive socialization?
12
Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice, p. 207.
13
For examples, see Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics; Meyers, Self, Society,
and Personal Choice.

regarded as nonautonomous by many feminists. This is because such preferences are
influenced by pernicious aspects of the oppressive context. They therefore attract what I
call the feminist intuition, which claims that preferences influenced by oppressive norms
of femininity cannot be autonomous.14

Stoljar questions whether the “pernicious aspects of [an] oppressive context” can be adequately captured and filtered out by a formal procedure.
She believes that many feminists rightly question the autonomy of some
decisions even if they appear to be in keeping with preferences that were
reflectively endorsed. She calls this skepticism “the feminist intuition”—
the idea that “preferences influenced by oppressive norms” cannot be
autonomous. Stoljar argues that the only way to adequately address the
feminist intuition is to adopt a substantive approach to autonomy theory.
I agree.
Although preferences could be influenced by oppressive norms in a
variety of ways, I will focus on internalized oppression. In this paper, I
will argue that the only way to adequately address the problem of internalized oppression is with a substantive theory of autonomy. This is because procedural theories rely only on the subjective perspective,15 but
we cannot articulate (and thereby rule out) what is pernicious about some
forms of socialization with a purely formal procedure that remains committed to the subjective perspective. I argue that decisions resulting from
false beliefs that rely on subordinating reasoning and perpetuate oppression should not count as autonomous. However, this uses nonsubjective
or external criteria to decide what counts as autonomous.
Using the criteria just outlined, I will argue that decisions that reflect
a certain devaluation of self (or lack of self-worth) should not count as
autonomous. This troubles procedural theorists because it violates the
content neutrality they cherish. Procedural theorists are committed to
content neutrality because they are committed to the subjective perspec14

Stoljar, “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition,” p. 95.
Many feminist approaches to autonomy have focused on what is called relational
autonomy. In these approaches, theorists discuss how autonomy is developed and expressed in a social context. For example, Meyers identifies a list of skills necessary for
making autonomous decisions that she calls “autonomy competencies.” In this way,
many feminist theorists try to account for nonsubjective or external influences on autonomy. However, those theorists who remain committed to the procedural approach will
still fall back on the internal decision-making procedure of reflection and endorsement
when considering whether a specific decision is or is not autonomous. This is problematic
when trying to account for internalized oppression because a key aspect of internalized
oppression is that it distorts a person’s preferences. I will say more about internalized
oppression and the procedure for autonomous decision-making later in the paper. Here I
simply want to acknowledge that feminist theorists committed to the procedural approach
do discuss some nonsubjective or external influences on autonomy. However, my argument is that their analysis of these external factors is not sufficiently integrated into their
procedure for autonomous decision-making.
15

tive; therefore, they argue that any decision stemming from the appropriate internal decision-making process (as outlined above) should count as
autonomous. Thus, procedural theorists would argue that my substantive
theory unduly restricts the scope of autonomy or the range of decisions
that would count as autonomous.
Can Subservient Wives Be Autonomous?
Case 1: The Deferential Wife
To understand better why feminists need a substantive theory of autonomy, consider Thomas Hill’s classic example of the Deferential Wife. As
Hill describes her:
This is a woman who is utterly devoted to serving her husband. She buys the clothes he
prefers, invites the guests he wants to entertain, and makes love whenever he is in the
mood … She loves her husband, but her conduct is not simply an expression of love. She
is happy, but she does not subordinate herself as a means to happiness. She does not
simply defer to her husband in certain spheres as a trade-off for his deference in other
spheres. On the contrary, she tends not to form her own interests, values, and ideals; and,
when she does, she counts them as less important than her husband’s. She readily responds to appeals from Women’s Liberation that she agrees that women are mentally and
physically equal, if not superior, to men. She just believes that the proper role for a woman is to serve her family. As a matter of fact, much of her happiness derives from her
belief that she fulfills this role very well. No one is trampling on her rights, she says; for
she is quite glad, and proud, to serve her husband as she does.16

Most feminists would agree that Hill is describing a classic case of internalized oppression. Despite her stated belief that men and women are
equal, her behavior and her belief that “the proper role of women is to
serve the family” illustrate how she has internalized oppressive norms of
femininity.17 Using this example, I will illustrate the difference between a
feminist procedural approach to autonomy and my substantive approach.
In Autonomy, Gender, Politics, Marilyn Friedman gives us a feminist
example of a procedural approach to autonomy. According to Friedman,
if a person’s choices and actions are to be autonomous, she must reflect
on her wants and values—choosing to endorse some and, presumably,
reject others. Also, a person’s decisions should reflect those wants and
values she has endorsed (or what is important to her). In sum, Friedman
16
Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), pp. 5-6 (emphasis in original).
17
For examples of how feminine norms can feel empowering at the same time as they
are perpetuating women’s (including the individual woman’s) oppression, see Bartky’s
analysis of emotional caring and both Bartky’s and Meyers’s analysis of feminine beauty
norms. Bartky, Femininity and Domination; Meyers, Gender in the Mirror.

is advocating the process of critical reflection as I have described it.
Friedman, like other procedural theorists, also emphasizes content neutrality.18 The only constraint she puts on the process of reflection is that it
must be “relatively unimpeded by conditions, such as coercion, deception, and manipulation.”19 Let us compare an earlier analysis Friedman
made of Hill’s Deferential Wife to her more recent theory of autonomy.
Hill argues that certain forms of servility are wrong because a person
ignores her worth as an equal moral being. Friedman agrees that some
forms of servility are wrong, but disagrees with Hill’s reasoning. Specifically, Friedman argues that it would be okay for a woman to defer to her
husband’s preferences if (a) in doing so his preferences become her preferences and (b) she does so without violating her own moral ideals or
principles. Friedman claims that if a woman believes it is her duty to
serve her husband, then “this means that she takes the preferences of certain other persons for her own; they become her preferences as the result
of a moral commitment on her part.”20 Once a woman decides that it is
her proper role to serve her husband, then his preferences become her
preferences. Thus, according to Friedman, submitting to his preferences
is a self-defining commitment. She also argues that the Deferential
Wife’s servility is a problem only if she submits to her husband’s preferences uncritically, because this undermines her moral integrity. However, as long as the Deferential Wife submits only to those preferences
that do not violate her own moral ideals or principles, then she can maintain her moral integrity, and thus her status as a moral being.21 Although
she does not use the language of autonomy here, it seems that Friedman
would have to argue that the Deferential Wife’s commitment to servility
is also an autonomous decision as long as she does not submit to fulfilling her husband’s preferences “uncritically.”
In contrast, Marcia Baron defends Hill’s analysis and argues that
Friedman’s argument misses the point about what is really wrong with
this form of servility. Baron and Hill argue that what is wrong is not
whether the Deferential Wife ultimately adopts her husband’s preferences or retains her moral integrity by not submitting to preferences that
violate her moral ideals, but that her decision to submit to her husband in
the first place is the problem.
The problem isn’t that I didn’t critically examine his preferences before deferring to
them; critical examination of my reasons for deferring would be much more in order here

18

Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, pp. 19-25.
Ibid., p. 14.
20
Marilyn Friedman, “Moral Integrity and the Deferential Wife,” Philosophical Studies 47 (1985): 141-50, p. 144.
21
Ibid., pp. 145-47.
19

than scrutiny of the preferences. In short, the Deferential Wife’s flaw can’t be her failure
to subject to scrutiny the preferences to which she defers.22

In other words, the problem is not that the Deferential Wife failed to utilize the formal procedure for making autonomous decisions (or failed to
put her beliefs through some process of self-reflection and endorsement),
but it is the beliefs themselves (or her reasons for deferring) that spark
the feminist intuition. It is the nature of the servility (i.e., deferring to her
husband because it is a women’s proper role) that raises the feminist intuition, because it expresses oppressive norms of femininity. Indeed, Baron and Hill argue that the problem with the Deferential Wife’s servility
is that she does not understand herself as an equal moral being, and, as
Hill argues, “consent resulting from underestimation of one’s moral status is not autonomously given.”23
I believe that Baron’s and Hill’s analysis more accurately captures the
feminist intuition. It is the nature of the servility that raises the feminist
intuition, because it also replicates oppressive norms of femininity. In
sketching out how a substantive theory of autonomy would approach this
problem, I try to articulate Baron’s and Hill’s intuition in a more methodical way. The Deferential Wife has false beliefs (i.e., that women’s
“proper role” is to serve their family) that rely on subordinating reasoning (i.e., it is the wife’s duty to subsume her preferences to her husband’s) and that perpetuate her own oppression (e.g., reinforcing restrictive roles for women and undermining women’s equality).24
Let me be clear that I am not arguing that women could never autonomously choose to be stay-at-home wives or defer to their partners in
some things or situations.25 I am arguing that some forms of servility and
deference cannot be autonomous—namely, those that are the result of
internalized oppression. In sum, I am arguing that feminists need a strong
substantive theory of autonomy that assesses both the specific beliefs
influencing a person’s decision and how those beliefs relate to the broader social context. I am arguing that false beliefs that rely on subordinating reasoning and perpetuate oppressive systems are forms of interna22

Marcia Baron, “Servility, Critical Deference, and the Deferential Wife,” Philosophical Studies 48 (1985): 393-400, p. 398.
23
Hill, Autonomy and Self-Respect, p. 13.
24
For examples of how this form of traditional gender roles perpetuates women’s
oppression (including the individual woman’s oppression), see Linda R. Hirshman, Get to
Work: A Manifesto for Women of the World (New York: Viking, 2006); Susan Moller
Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
25
In our current society, though, any choice to stay home will be suspect given not
only gender norms, but also economic pressures. However, since my focus in this paper
is internalized oppression, I will not pursue the potentially coercive effects of other forms
of oppression. For a discussion of other forms of oppression, see Cudd, Analyzing Oppression.

lized oppression, and therefore decisions that result from these beliefs
should not count as autonomous.
I do not believe that all false beliefs are a problem. Consider a baseball player who believes he must wear his lucky socks to win a game.
Many of us would consider this a false belief, but I do not think it would
raise the feminist intuition. It is a rather benign belief and it is unlikely to
be the result of “pernicious forms of socialization.” We could also have
subordinating beliefs that do not contribute to an oppressive system.
Consider a committed activist who chooses to defer decisions and public
attention to a charismatic leader. This is a type of subordination, but not
necessarily a pernicious one. If we put these together, we can see that
what raises the feminist intuition are subordinating beliefs that perpetuate
oppression. Therefore, we must look at how a belief or reasons for a belief situate groups in relation to each other. I believe that this is what
raises the feminist intuition and leads some feminists to argue that these
decisions are not autonomous.
Case 2: The Surrendered Wife
Let us return to the debate over the Deferential Wife, but use a real-life
example. In 2001, Laura Doyle published The Surrendered Wife. According to Doyle, “The underlying principle of The Surrendered Wife is simple: the control women wield at work and with children must be left at the
front door of any marriage to revitalize intimacy.”26 Her book has received
a number of positive reviews and substantial media coverage. She continues to give public talks supporting her philosophy and, according to at
least one news special in 2007, more than 100,000 women have adopted
her program. Although Doyle claims that this is not about subservience,
she does compare it to ballroom dancing, where one person must lead (the
husband) and the other must follow (the wife). Also, the point of “surrendering” is that the woman gives up control (specifically of the finances and
her opinions) and learns to trust her husband.27 In the news reports of
specific couples who have adopted this approach, the wife does everything from drawing her husband’s bath, to having him approve her list of
daily chores, to giving him complete control over when they have sex.28
In this way, the women are very similar to Hill’s Deferential Wife who
submits to her husband’s every wish and whim. In other words, a woman’s decision to become a Surrendered Wife raises the feminist intuition.
26

Laura Doyle, The Surrendered Wife (2001; accessed March 19, 2009); www.
surrenderedwife.com.
27
Ibid.
28
Peter Harvey, Under the Thumb (2007; accessed March 19, 2009); http://sixtyminutes.
ninemsn.com.au/article.aspx?id=270407.

There are a number of ways to interpret the decision to become a Surrendered Wife. To clarify my position, I will consider three—the kind of
oppressive norms reflected in this decision, the nature of the subordination, and what this case tells us about the relationship between oppressive
socialization and the procedure for autonomy.
First, many of the women who “choose” to become a Surrendered
Wife seem to be motivated by the desire to save the relationship at the
expense of other desires.29 In response to a question about why she chose
to become a Surrendered Wife, Caroline says, “I was getting to the point
in my marriage where I wasn’t happy. And Chip and I were not getting
along at all and we were talking about maybe just me going and doing
my own thing.” Similarly, the statements made by many of these women
imply that it was easier to acquiesce than to keep fighting with their husbands. For example, Doyle says, “My loneliness was so acute I was willing to try anything to cure it … Fortunately, the steps of surrendering
helped me with both marital tranquility and self-respect.”30 Here we have
presumably competent, independent women who found their relationships in trouble. Rather than forgo the relationship, they chose to “surrender” their equality. Obviously it is impossible to know all the reasons
each woman made these choices, but the fact that so many independent
women would “choose” to give up independence rather than be single
raises my feminist intuition.
Also, once the women “chose” to become Surrendered Wives, they
seem to adopt a variety of negative female stereotypes that are the result of
oppressive norms of femininity. For example, Caroline says, “Shutting my
mouth is kind of very hard. That’s been the hardest for me but I’ve learned
to do it.”31 I argue that statements like this show a subtle form of internalized oppression—namely, the idea that women should not be overly opinionated or at least not assertive about expressing their opinions or beliefs.
Consider another quote from Doyle: “None of us feels good about ourselves when we’re nagging, critical, or controlling. I certainly didn’t. The
tone of my voice alone would make me cringe with self-recrimination.
Through surrendering, you will find the courage to gradually stop indulging in these unpleasant behaviors and replace them with dignified
ones.”32 Again, this sounds like a woman who is motivated by oppressive
norms of femininity—namely, that women should be quiet, passive, and
unopinionated instead of assertive and in control of their lives.33
29

I thank Allyson Robichaud for this insight.
Doyle, The Surrendered Wife.
31
Harvey, Under the Thumb.
32
Doyle, The Surrendered Wife.
33
I should point out that Doyle centers her theory around women’s need to control
men. I admit that many in our culture are taught to obsess about what others are doing or
30

Taken together, these quotes show that many women are motivated
by oppressive norms of femininity when deciding to become a Surrendered Wife. To explain why we should not consider decisions that are the
result of oppressive norms of femininity autonomous, I attempt to clarify
what is problematic about these decisions. They rely on false beliefs
(e.g., assertive women are “shrewish”) that lead to subordination (e.g.,
wife allows husband to control daily decisions) and perpetuate oppression (e.g., reinforce negative stereotypes, leave women vulnerable, and
so on). I further claim that this is another way to interpret Hill’s and Baron’s claim that the problem with the Deferential Wife is that she underestimates her worth as an equal moral being. To elaborate on this point,
I turn to my second interpretation of the Surrendered Wife phenomenon.
Another way to understand what is problematic about the decision to
become a Surrendered Wife is to consider what “surrendering” entails or
the nature of the subordination. Autonomy theorists have long argued
about whether one could “autonomously” choose to submit to slavery or
the idea of how much autonomy you can willingly relinquish. To help
explain where I draw the line and why, I compare my interpretation to
Marina Oshana’s theory of autonomy.34
Oshana criticizes what she calls “internalist” or “psychological” theories of autonomy (what I call procedural), and instead proposes an “externalist” or “socio-relational” theory of autonomy (what I call substantive).
Oshana’s approach is similar to mine in that we both argue that you cannot fully articulate what counts as autonomous from only the subjective (or
internal) view. However, Oshana and I differ on how we should interpret
external constraints or the interplay between internal and external aspects
of autonomy. Oshana argues that certain external constraints undermine
autonomy because they take away a person’s ability to control her life.35
Based on this argument, Oshana argues that a monk has relinquished his
autonomy because he has given control over his life to another.36 I disnot doing and try to control them in various ways. For a good analysis of power-with
instead of this type of power-over, see Sarah Lucia Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics: Toward
New Values (Palo Alto, Cal.: Institute of Lesbian Studies, 1988); Starhawk, Truth or
Dare: Encounters with Power, Authority, and Mystery (New York: HarperCollins, 1990).
However, Doyle’s analysis is very different from Hoagland’s or Starhawk’s. Rather than
discussing how we should reframe disagreements and our attitudes toward others, Doyle
claims that we should replace women trying to control men with men controlling (or as
she puts it “leading”) women and the family.
34
Marina Oshana, Personal Autonomy in Society (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2006).
35
In this paper, I am mainly concerned with internalized oppression, so my emphasis
is on “pernicious forms of socialization.” Admittedly, oppression in general can take
other forms, such as economic deprivation or political marginalization. As such, it is
possible that other external constraints might also undermine autonomy. For the sake of
space, I will not deal with those here.
36
Ibid., pp. 62-64.

agree. I believe you can make an autonomous decision to submit yourself
to another’s authority in certain circumstances. What makes the Surrendered Wife’s decision problematic in a way that the monk’s decision is
not is that her decision reflects internalized social norms that devalue her
worth as a moral being. In contrast, barring any extenuating circumstances, there is no reason to believe the monk’s decision was motivated
by internalized oppressive norms. In fact, part of his motivation could be
the enhanced social standing he will receive as a result of his decision.37
In this way, the Surrendered Wife raises the feminist intuition in a way
that the monk does not.
I believe the two interpretations outlined above are enough to explain
why the Surrendered Wife’s decision should not count as autonomous. In
my third interpretation, I return to the question of why a substantive
theory is better able to address the feminist intuition than procedural
theories. Here I will perform a more in-depth analysis to show why procedural autonomy theories have trouble with this sort of example or why
a substantive theory is necessary for feminist autonomy theorists.
What would a procedural autonomy theorist say about a woman’s
decision to become a Surrendered Wife? All of the women quoted earlier
made an active decision to change the parameters of their relationships.
Therefore, they had to have some level of self-reflection when making
this radical shift in their behavior and lifestyle. Doyle admits that she is
constantly struggling to live up to her ideal of the Surrendered Wife
which implies that she continues to reflect on her decision. Many of the
other women seem to imply a similar sort of reflection and active decision-making. Skye says about her pre-surrendered wife relationship: “I
would say I was trying to rule the roost, I was trying to take over, I was
like, ‘Hey, I don’t think you know how things work around here, pal. I
don’t think you quite get that I’m the boss here’ and that’s the way it
works in relationships.” In contrast, here is how Skye feels about being a
Surrendered Wife: “I’ve discovered through experience, doing it for
three years, that usually if I had done it the way that I was going to do it,
it wouldn’t have turned out as great as it did when he made the decision.
He wears the trousers, absolutely, without a shadow of the doubt. I
wouldn’t have it any other way.”38 Based on these comments, I believe
that the women would pass a procedural theorist’s criteria for an autonomous decision.
To show why procedural theorists would have to consider the Surrendered Wife’s decision autonomous, I return to Friedman’s theory of
37
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autonomy. In Autonomy, Gender, Politics, Friedman considers whether
romantic love is a threat to women’s autonomy. In her discussion of romantic love, Friedman admits that women are subject to social pressures
that devalue women’s autonomy, belittle women’s aspirations that do not
include caring for others, and encourage women to subsume their values
and beliefs to love relationships regardless of whether that is their primary concern.39 She further acknowledges that (because of these social
pressures) heterosexual romantic love poses a greater threat to women’s
autonomy than men’s autonomy. Yet, Friedman claims that as long as a
woman has made the relationship her self-defining value, then sustaining
that relationship is an expression of autonomy for her.
The relationship now is, by definition, the woman’s overriding concern for which she
will sacrifice other important values ... As such, it is a self-defining commitment for her.
By acting in accord with that commitment, a woman does not actually give up autonomy;
instead she shows a significant degree of it. Thus a woman who values her relationships
more than she values autonomy, and who acts to maintain her romantic relationship, becomes autonomous after all.40

According to Friedman, the woman must use some level of selfreflection in making her decision. Obviously, the Surrendered Wives are
reflective about their decision. Similarly, Friedman argues that once
women take on the relationship (or in this case being a Surrendered
Wife) as a self-defining commitment, then living up to that commitment
is an expression of their autonomy. Again, these comments show that the
women have embraced the role of the Surrendered Wife. In sum, I believe Friedman would have to consider the decisions to become a Surrendered Wife autonomous.
If the love relationship is this woman’s self-defining commitment and
a reflection of her autonomy, then we must assume (by Friedman’s own
definition of autonomy) that this value had to be put through some
process of self-reflection that was not the result of coercion or manipulation. The question we can now ask is: Do the social pressures Friedman
acknowledges add up to coercion, deception, and manipulation? Stoljar
claims that feminists will question whether preferences influenced by
oppressive norms of femininity can be autonomous. In her procedural
account of autonomy, Friedman acknowledges the influence of feminine
socialization on personal preferences, but she does not go on to explain
how the procedure for autonomous decision-making can rule out preferences developed through oppressive socialization as autonomous.41 For
39
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example, do oppressive social influences skew the process of critical reflection?
Friedman begins with an analysis of social pressures, but ends by
claiming that values reflectively endorsed are autonomous. As Stoljar
points out, “The question for all theories of autonomy is what kinds of
socialization are incompatible with autonomy.”42 To understand why
oppressive socialization is problematic in a way that nonoppressive socialization is not, we need to look more closely at how it (potentially)
skews the process of critical reflection (or the exact question Friedman
avoids). Along with Stoljar, I believe we can adequately address this
problem only by using a strong substantive theory. To show how a strong
substantive theory can begin to deal with the problem of internalized oppression (and further illustrate the problem with procedural theories), I
turn to the work of Paul Benson.
In “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization,” Benson attempts to
give “an explanation of the autonomy-inhibiting effects of some socialization while sustaining the nonskeptical conclusion that a good deal of
our socialization, though it influences us profoundly, need not interfere
with autonomy.”43 Like Meyers, Benson agrees that we cannot escape
the influence of socialization. The key is to find a way to distinguish between pernicious and benign socialization. Benson uses the example of
feminine beauty norms to argue that feminine socialization causes women to internalize oppressive norms—namely, the idea that women should
make themselves physically appealing to men. He further argues that
these norms undermine women’s autonomy because they cause women
to internalize false beliefs (such as that their worth is tied to their attractiveness to men) and keeps them from being able to “critically evaluate”
these false beliefs.
I have suggested that feminine socialization gains much of its power by operating to
deceive many women about the significance that cultivating an appearance which is
pleasing to men has for women’s worth as persons. Women’s autonomy is reduced to the
extent that they are socially trained to be blind to the reasons there are for them to regard
their appearance differently than the norms of femininity recommend.44

In his substantive theory, Benson adds a critical competence criterion
that requires an autonomous person to be able to “detect and appreciate

themselves involve sacrifices of her autonomy in other ways” (ibid., pp. 137-38). Specifically, the woman must have and periodically use some autonomy skills. At this point, we
could ask whether Friedman is sneaking substantive requirements into her procedural
theory. To avoid confusion, I will not pursue this question here.
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the reasons there are to act in various ways.”45 He argues that feminine
socialization concerning feminine beauty norms undermines this critical
competence.46
While I am not convinced that Benson adequately distinguishes between pernicious and benign forms of socialization,47 his analysis does
help articulate what is wrong with a procedural approach. Benign and
pernicious socialization can influence the process of critical reflection in
the same way. Later in the article, Benson admits that men as well as
women internalize cultural standards for feminine beauty norms and as a
result men “may be blinded systematically to important reasons there are
for them to treat women differently.”48 Yet, Benson also admits that this
socialization does not undermine men’s autonomy in the same way it
undermines women’s. I believe this is because the real problem with oppressive socialization is not that it undermines critical competence or
unduly narrows the reasons for action we will consider (many forms of
socialization can do this). What is truly harmful about internalized oppression is the way it undermines a person’s sense of self-worth, and
thereby makes her complicit in her own oppression.49
We could make an analogy here between the procedure for autonomous decision-making and cooking chicken and dumplings. Most recent
theories of autonomy acknowledge that individuals are embedded in a
social context, and as a result will internalize a variety of social norms.
Similarly, I begin the process of cooking chicken and dumplings by
combining a variety of ingredients—vegetables, chicken, broth, and
spices. After combining the ingredients, I let them simmer so that the
various flavors mingle and infuse each other. Allowing my dish to simmer is similar to the process of reflection used by procedural theorists.
The individual considers preferences, but only from within her social
context. Her social context and personal history (the ingredients put into
45
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the mix) will influence the process of reflection. Moreover, her various
preferences will influence each other (in the way various ingredients infuse each other with their distinct flavors). After simmering for a while, I
must strain out bones and other unwanted “bits.” In this way, I keep what
I want in the dish, but get rid of what I do not want. Similarly, procedural
theorists believe the process of critical reflection allows the individual to
“strain out” unwanted preferences while solidifying her commitment to
the ones that are left.
Returning to the problem of oppressive versus nonoppressive socialization, my argument is that they function in the same way in the procedure for autonomous decision-making. The process of reflection and
identification proceeds in the same way for every internalized norm just
as the process of making chicken and dumplings will proceed in the same
way (combining ingredients, simmering, and straining the final product),
no matter what ingredients are put in. However, I can make the dish inedible by adding poison—for example, arsenic. The arsenic does not disrupt the process of making chicken and dumplings, but it makes the final
dish inedible. In addition, to understand why I should not add this ingredient to my dish, I have to understand the relationship between certain
substances and human metabolism, not the mechanics of simmering and
straining broths. I need to know something “outside” of the recipe or my
understanding of how to prepare this dish. Similarly, we cannot strain or
filter out oppressive norms using only a formal procedure for autonomous decision-making. To understand what feminists find problematic
about internalized oppressive norms (or why they should not be considered autonomous), we have to understand their relationship to other
norms and how they position the individual in her social context. In other
words, we need nonsubjective criteria.
Thus, Benson’s critical competence addition to the process of critical
reflection is not enough. All socialization restricts options in this way.
Given our previous histories and socialization, we are not open to all reasons for action, nor would this be a good thing.50 In this way, both oppressive and nonoppressive socialization shape critical reflection in the
same way. What is problematic about oppressive socialization is that it
undermines a person’s sense of self-worth. This indirectly skews the
process of critical reflection in a problematic way, because a person uses
oppressive norms (that degrade her status as a human being) to make
certain decisions. In other words, precisely what is wrong with these decisions is that they rely on internalized oppressive norms. Benson more
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accurately captures this problem when he discusses the nature of the
false belief (or how women are taught to tie feminine beauty norms to
their personal worth). However, we cannot see this problem or fully articulate it unless we step outside of the subjective perspective. Just because a person chooses to do X does not make it nonautonomous. If we
consider that a person chooses to do X for reason Y and reason Y is an
internalized norm that perpetuates oppression, then my substantive
theory of autonomy would rule it out as autonomous.51
To summarize, the strong substantive approach I am advocating
would analyze not just the self-reflective part of the decision-making
process, but also how various desires or beliefs that motivate these decisions are or are not influenced by pernicious forms of socialization. In
her analysis, Stoljar analyzes a study of women and contraceptive risktaking completed by Kristen Luker. Stoljar argues that women’s contraceptive choices
are judged to be nonautonomous because they are overly influenced in their decisions
about contraception by stereotypical and incorrect norms of femininity and sexual agency. Unlike risk-takers in other domains, such as those who smoke or fail to wear safety
belts in a car, Luker’s subjects are motivated by oppressive and misguided norms that are
internalized as a result of feminine socialization.52

Similarly, I believe the Surrendered Wives are “motivated by oppression
and misguided norms that are internalized as a result of feminine socialization.” The decision to become a Surrendered Wife meets the criteria I
outlined earlier—it is the result of false beliefs that rely on subordinating
reasoning (i.e., women should “surrender” or be subordinate to their husbands) and perpetuate oppressive systems (i.e., the devaluing of women).
However, we can articulate how these particular decisions are an example of internalized oppression only by stepping outside of the subjective
perspective. Therefore, we can capture what is truly wrong (or nonautonomous) about these decisions only with a strong substantive theory of
autonomy.
As I mentioned earlier, procedural theorists are committed to content
neutrality because they do not want to rule out traditionally “feminine”
values or goals as autonomous. While I applaud this goal, I worry that if
we acknowledge oppressive social pressures without adequately analyzing how they influence autonomy, then we will be left with a theory of
autonomy that is too generous. I worry that if we ignore the feminist intuition and call these cases autonomous, we will end up devaluing part of
the harm of internalized oppression—namely, how it denigrates a person
and makes her complicit in perpetuating her own oppression.
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Addressing Procedural Theorists’ Concerns
As we can see from the previous section, adopting a substantive theory
of autonomy will narrow the scope of decisions that count as autonomous by applying more rigorous standards, while procedural theories of
autonomy include a broader range of decisions. One reason procedural
autonomy theorists reject substantive autonomy theories is that they worry about how substantive theories might narrow the scope of autonomy.
This is why procedural theorists are committed to content neutrality and
the subjective perspective. One criticism that feminist philosophers made
of traditional theories of autonomy is that they included masculine norms
or required substantive independence. In response, feminist autonomy
theorists wanted to create a conception of autonomy that included a broad
range of lives, goals, and preferences. Thus, many procedural theorists
worry that if we include nonsubjective criteria into autonomy we will
again unduly restrict the scope of autonomy. In response, I would emphasize that we are talking about specific decisions, not entire lives. If
we decide that decisions and actions that are the result of internalized
oppression should not count as autonomous, then this does not mean that
we believe individuals making these decisions have no autonomy. For
example, an individual woman might be perfectly autonomous in her
decisions about what career to pursue and whether or not to get married,
but not autonomous in her decision to have a baby or get cosmetic surgery.
Procedural theorists also worry that the kind of criteria substantive
autonomy theorists, like myself, want to include will overemphasize
women’s victimhood, and thereby ignore women’s agency. For example,
in her critique of Paul Benson’s and Susan Babbitt’s theories, Diana
Meyers states: “Restrictive, value-saturated accounts of autonomy are
troubling because they promiscuously stigmatize women as victims and
because they homogenize authentic selves and autonomous lives.”53 On
the other hand, I worry that procedural autonomy theorists are too generous. If we call decisions influenced by oppressive socialization “autonomous,” then do we devalue the harm of internalized oppression?54 I
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believe “autonomy” should be held to a higher standard. However, I believe the implications of this are less far-reaching than procedural autonomy theorists believe. Similar to Baron and Hill, I am not interested in
“blaming” the Deferential Wife or the Surrendered Wife for her decision.
Nor do I believe arguing that many decisions are nonautonomous means
we should not allow people to make them. As a society, we regularly
allow people to make all kinds of stupid or self-destructive decisions.
Instead, we can separate how we categorize specific decisions from discussions about what decisions people should be allowed to make.
In “The Kantian Conception of Autonomy,” Thomas Hill distinguishes between what he calls “autonomy as a right” and a “psychological
conception of autonomy.”55 A psychological conception of autonomy
means that a person “has a kind of independence of judgment which
young children and unthinking conformists lack.”56 This is the conception of autonomy debated by personal autonomy theorists. In contrast,
autonomy as a right has to do with the range of decisions a person is allowed to make.
To be an autonomous person, on this view [autonomy as a right], is to have a moral right
to make certain decisions for oneself, to control certain aspects of one’s life without interference. The working analogy here, apparently, is with autonomous states, which are such
not because they are governed in a particularly effective or high-minded way but because
they have a right that other nations not interfere in their internal affairs.57

If we accentuate this distinction, then we can have a more rigorous
theory of personal or psychological autonomy (which more adequately
accommodates the problem of internalized oppression) without undermining other feminist goals (e.g., it preserves autonomy as a right).58
Arguing that women should have autonomy as a right (by which I
mean being allowed to fully participate in political and social systems
and being allowed to make certain decisions about their own lives) does
not require that I commit myself to a specific theory of personal autonFor a fuller discussion of why I believe this is the case, see Sonya Charles, “The Limits
of ‘Autonomy’ for Feminist Theory,” Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University,
2006.
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omy. I can remain agnostic about what personal autonomy actually requires. To argue for autonomy as a right is to argue that similar groups
should face similar limits. In other words, I can argue that women (and
other subordinated groups) should be allowed to participate equally in
the institution of limits (such as laws and customs) without committing
myself to a specific theory of personal autonomy. The argument here is
that in a given society, autonomy as a right (or the control over your life
given to individuals) should be the same for all adults regardless of race,
sex, and so on. In this way, autonomy as a right raises questions of justice. In contrast, personal or psychological autonomy seems to raise different (if related) questions that can be dealt with separately.59
In sum, feminist autonomy theorists should not fear strong substantive theories of autonomy. Procedural theorists are correct that strong
substantive theories would narrow the scope of decisions that count as
autonomous. However, I hope I have shown that this is not the problem
they fear it to be. If feminists embrace the distinction between autonomy
as a right and psychological autonomy, we can continue to argue against
oppressive norms that restrict women’s freedom and control over their
lives while we continue to work on a more adequate theory of personal
autonomy.60
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